The result in one sentence
The frozen asymmetric close-channel family consistently reduced drawdown on both BTC and ETH, but did not establish the positive excess return required by the test.
Every one of the six frozen members finished with a shallower maximum drawdown than identically costed buy-and-hold. That part of the hypothesis worked descriptively.
The return evidence did not.
On BTC, all three members had negative mean daily excess log return. On ETH, all three point estimates were positive, but every one-sided 95% HAC lower bound remained below zero. The primary 55/20 member therefore failed on both markets, no robustness member rescued either family, and the frozen cross-market hypothesis closed DID_NOT_MEET_CRITERIA.
That distinction is exactly why the criterion had more than one condition.
What we froze before looking at the result
Candidate 002 was an ORIGINAL_HYPOTHESIS_VALIDATION. It was not chosen by scanning Strategy Lab’s own historical results for a profitable combination.
The mechanism was deliberately small:
- FLAT → LONG when today’s daily close is strictly above the highest close of the previous entry lookback;
- LONG → FLAT when today’s daily close is strictly below the lowest close of the previous 20 completed daily bars;
- otherwise preserve the current state;
- calculate the signal at the daily close and execute any change at the next daily open;
- no shorts, leverage, stops, profit targets, pyramiding, volatility filter, or position sizing.
The primary member used a 55-day entry / 20-day exit. Two nearby entry-horizon perturbations were frozen as robustness checks:
| Member | Role | Entry lookback | Exit lookback |
|---|
| breakout_50_20 | robustness | 50 days | 20 days |
| breakout_55_20 | primary | 55 days | 20 days |
| breakout_60_20 | robustness | 60 days | 20 days |
Why 55/20
The horizon asymmetry was Turtle-derived, not a Turtle-system reproduction. The historical Turtle System 2 convention used a 55-day breakout entry and a 20-day opposite-channel exit. Candidate 002 borrowed only that pre-Bitcoin horizon asymmetry.
The implementation here is materially narrower: completed daily closes rather than intraday highs/lows, LONG/FLAT exposure, Strategy Lab’s next-open execution and accounting, no volatility sizing, no protective stop, no pyramiding, and no futures portfolio.
That distinction mattered for the research design. The 55/20 primary was anchored outside these BTC and ETH evaluation results. The 50/20 and 60/20 members were only a small ±5-day perturbation around the entry horizon, while the 20-day exit remained fixed. We did not open a two-dimensional parameter grid.
The same family was frozen independently for BTCUSDT and ETHUSDT. The two markets were not combined into a portfolio and the six members were not treated as one family.
Both market specifications used the same evaluation interval, execution convention, accounting, benchmark, costs, and statistical criterion. The evaluation interval was [2023-09-01, 2026-09-01), or 1,096 evaluation days.
The primary transaction cost was 15 basis points per executed leg, with 20 and 25 bps retained as adverse-cost diagnostics. The benchmark was identically costed buy-and-hold.
What counted as success
A member had to satisfy all three parts of excess_return_drawdown_v1:
- positive mean daily excess log return versus identically costed buy-and-hold;
- a positive one-sided 95% HAC lower bound for that mean excess return;
- strictly improved maximum drawdown versus the benchmark.
Each market then used the same primary_plus_robustness family rule:
- the 55/20 primary had to meet the member criterion;
- at least one of 50/20 or 60/20 had to meet it too.
The broader Candidate 002 hypothesis was frozen to require both BTC and ETH families to succeed. One completed market failure was therefore enough for the cross-market claim not to meet its criterion.
BTC: drawdown improved, excess return did not
BTC buy-and-hold returned +202.02% cumulatively after the same primary cost assumption and experienced a maximum drawdown of −52.97%.
All three breakout variants reduced that drawdown materially:
| BTC member | Cumulative return | Mean excess | HAC 95% lower bound | Max drawdown | Outcome |
|---|
| 50/20 | +120.34% | −2.88 bps/day | −11.23 bps/day | −35.93% | DID_NOT_MEET_CRITERIA |
| 55/20 primary | +112.35% | −3.21 bps/day | −11.65 bps/day | −37.38% | DID_NOT_MEET_CRITERIA |
| 60/20 | +125.29% | −2.67 bps/day | −11.03 bps/day | −38.37% | DID_NOT_MEET_CRITERIA |
| Buy-and-hold | +202.02% | benchmark | benchmark | −52.97% | benchmark |
The defensive effect is visible: the strategy spent far less time exposed and avoided part of the benchmark’s drawdown.
But the research question was not merely whether the filter could reduce risk. Every BTC member had a negative mean excess-return estimate, so the family failed before uncertainty could rescue anything. The negative HAC lower bounds reinforce the same conclusion.
ETH: positive point estimates, but not enough evidence
ETH produced the more tempting result.
Identically costed buy-and-hold returned +49.49% cumulatively and experienced a −67.55% maximum drawdown.
Every breakout member again improved drawdown. Unlike BTC, every ETH member also had a positive mean excess-return point estimate:
| ETH member | Cumulative return | Mean excess | HAC 95% lower bound | Max drawdown | Outcome |
|---|
| 50/20 | +102.68% | +2.78 bps/day | −11.19 bps/day | −34.83% | DID_NOT_MEET_CRITERIA |
| 55/20 primary | +74.02% | +1.39 bps/day | −12.82 bps/day | −34.83% | DID_NOT_MEET_CRITERIA |
| 60/20 | +99.92% | +2.65 bps/day | −11.31 bps/day | −28.42% | DID_NOT_MEET_CRITERIA |
| Buy-and-hold | +49.49% | benchmark | benchmark | −67.55% | benchmark |
That is precisely where a looser backtest process could become misleading.
Just ’cause you feel it doesn’t mean it’s there.
The 50/20 and 60/20 ETH variants more than doubled capital over the evaluation period while buy-and-hold gained about 49%, and all three strategy paths had dramatically smaller maximum drawdowns. It would be easy to stop there and declare the idea promising.
The frozen test required more. The one-sided 95% HAC lower bound had to be positive. Instead, the bounds ranged from roughly −11.19 to −12.82 bps/day.
So the correct result is not “ETH passed.” It is that the observed ETH excess-return estimates were positive but too uncertain to establish the declared claim.
Why the drawdown result still matters
A failed research criterion does not mean every measured property was unfavorable.
Across both assets, all six members strictly improved maximum drawdown. For the primary 55/20 member:
- BTC improved from −52.97% buy-and-hold drawdown to −37.38%;
- ETH improved from −67.55% to −34.83%.
The 60/20 ETH member reached −28.42%, the shallowest drawdown among the six frozen variants.
Those are real properties of these historical simulations under the stated accounting and cost model. They just were not sufficient for the predeclared hypothesis, which required both downside improvement and convincing positive benchmark-relative return evidence.
That distinction prevents an attractive secondary metric from silently replacing the question fixed before evaluation.
Why we stop here
The six results create several obvious temptations:
- try a different exit horizon;
- extend the entry lookback;
- add a volatility filter;
- prefer ETH because its point estimates were positive;
- select 60/20 because its ETH drawdown was best;
- rerun the test on more markets.
None of those actions belongs inside Candidate 002 after observing these results.
The family was intentionally narrow so that the result could be interpreted without a large parameter search. Changing the mechanism or widening the grid now would create a new hypothesis informed by Candidate 002, not a robustness check that was somehow missing from this one.
The completed failure is therefore the endpoint of this experiment, not the start of a tuning loop.
What this result supports
The supported conclusion is:
Under the frozen 2023–2026 Binance Spot tests, the asymmetric 50/20, 55/20 and 60/20 close-channel families consistently reduced maximum drawdown on BTCUSDT and ETHUSDT, but neither market family established the combination of positive excess return, positive one-sided 95% HAC lower bound, and improved drawdown required by Candidate 002.
More specifically:
- BTC failed with negative mean excess return for all three members;
- ETH had positive mean excess-return point estimates for all three members, but all three HAC lower bounds remained negative;
- all six members improved maximum drawdown;
- both market families closed complete with 0 of 3 members meeting the frozen criterion.
It does not establish that close-channel trend following is universally unprofitable, that another market or period would behave the same way, or that these historical hypothetical simulations imply future execution or profitability.
The evaluation data were historical and publicly accessible before the study was frozen. Freeze-before-evaluation protects the decision rule from this experiment’s result; it does not turn old market data into genuinely unseen future observations.
Preserved evidence
The BTC normalized dataset is bound by SHA-256:
1a97c0e21d98f02992c3c46d8e82d0e93a3ca363d0bb44e6dfb3e04cfc5bd223
The ETH normalized dataset is bound by:
7474daf56025ab08f2f22327a2ed08c10177c3bb7abdebce4ad55e4e8b6751ec
The frozen family identities are:
- BTC: 9e9aa8cd71ac9f7d86dc2021cd0766a1ab53e14b3ba7cd8b089aefb852d81443
- ETH: 21855ecfe5dbe4f5e22e19943ad58ed3fe5096312d0dd4cc9cd80dae632a0549
Both captures contained 1,158 canonical daily rows and 39 retained provider archives. The two Strategy Lab handoffs below preserve every frozen member in declared order, the exact primary-cost metrics, diagnostic costs, HAC statistics, dataset identities, implementation identities, interpretation limits, and final artifact hashes.
The family members within each market share one price series and overlapping lookbacks, so they are strongly dependent. The family rule is a declared decision rule, not a calibrated family-wise confidence test.
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